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The Writ of Supervisory
Control
CLAUDE F. MORRIS*
In an article such as this it is neither feasible nor advisable
to deal specifically with the differing modes of procedure in
every jurisdiction. There is a wide divergence in the methods
of review relating to the appellate and supervisory powers of
the courts of last resort in the various jurisdictions. Speaking
generally as to the existing rules of procedure, it is no longer
possible to be sure of the nature of a review proceeding in
any particular jurisdiction from the name that is given to it.
The modern statutory appeal in many jurisdictions is a sub-
stitute of both the common-law writ of error and the appeal
in equity and partakes of the nature of both.
"The term 'appeal', as used, is a word of very indefinite
meaning. It is sometimes used to denote the nature of ap-
pellate jurisdiction, as distinguished from original jurisdiction,
without regard to the particular mode by which a cause is
submitted to a reviewing court. It rests with each state or
the federal government to prescribe the jurisdiction of its
appellate courts, the mode and time of invoking that jurisdic-
tion, and the rules of practice to be applied in its exercise.'
The supreme court of Montana derives all its powers from
the Constitution of the state, and the legislature may not limit
those powers. The legislature may, however, prescribe the
mode of procedure.
Section 2 of Article VIII provides that "The supreme
court except as otherwise provided in this constitution shall
have appellate jurisdiction only." Section 3 of the same article
specifies the writs of original jurisdiction which the supreme
court is expressly authorized to issue. The writ of Supervisory
Control is not expressly enumerated.
The Montana history of the writ of supervisory control
is one of evolution. The authority for its use is derived from
the general grant of power under the "supervisory control"
*Former Associate Justice, Montana Supreme Court.
'2 Am. Jur. 844-846.
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clause of section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution of the
state, and specific authority under the "Other Original and
Remedial Writs" clause of section 3 of the same article. The
writ is not one expressly mentioned in section 3 but is ground-
ed upon the phrase found in that section where, after naming
certain writs which the supreme court is authorized to issue,
it is said, "and such other original or remedial writs as may
be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its ap-
pellate jurisdiction."
Provisions similar to the supervisory provision found in
section 2 of Article VIII are also found in the constitutions of
the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky,
Michigan, Missouri, North and South Dakota, North and South
Carolina, Wisconsin, Wyoming and possibly others. The writ,
however, under that name is not in general use in any state
except Montana. It appears that other writs or modes of
procedure are in use in other states to accomplish the same
or similar purposes. Of the eleven cases cited in Words and
Phrases, under supervisory control, nine are from Montana, one
each from Wisconsin and Missouri, and one additional Mon-
tana case is found under "supervision." The supreme court
of Montana issues, hears, and determines more proceedings
that come to the court by way of petitions for the writ of
supervisory control than under all the other writs which the
court is authorized to issue, and petitions for the writ are
denied to fully half those who apply.
Amongst the many able jurists who have contributed to
the establishment of the rule relative to the supervisory con-
trol of the supreme court of this state we are chiefly indebted
to our late Chief Justice, The Honorable Theodore Brantly, a
man endowed with unusual powers of logic and reasoning.
The first outstanding case dealing with the court's powers of
supervisory control was that of State ex rel. Whiteside v. First
Judicial District Court', a contempt case involving the writs
of habeas corpus and certiorari. In presenting the court's
views as to the proper writ to be employed in that case, which
led to the splendid interpretation of the supervisory control
clause of the Constitution, the Chief Justice said that "The
grant of appellate jurisdiction from its very nature implies
also all the instrumentalities necessary to make it effective.
It is an established doctrine that one of the essential attributes
of appellate jurisdiction and one of the inherent powers of an
124 Mont. 539, 63 Pae. 395.
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appellate court is the right to make use of all the writs known
to the common-law, and if necessary, to invent new writs or
proceedings in order to suitably exercise the jurisdiction con-
ferred. * 0 It (the court's power of supervisory control) is
a power separate and distinct from the court's appellate juris-
diction but a power to be called into use to meet any exigency
for which no express remedy has been provided." In less than
a year after the Whiteside opinion was handed down, this
court, again speaking through Chief Justice Brantly, said':
"In the case of State ex rel. Whiteside v. District Court we
endeavored to point out, by what we deemed a proper construc-
tion of sections 2 and 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
that under that instrument there are four distinct grants of
power, viz., appellate jurisdiction, a general supervisory con-
trol over all inferior courts, discretionary power to issue, hear
and determine the various original writs enumerated, and the
power to issue, hear and determine such other original and
remedial writs as may be necessary to the complete exercise
of the appellate jurisdiction."
It was further said in the Whiteside case, relative to the
supervisory power of the supreme court, that "A similar
clause is found in the constitutions of many of the states of
the Union, and, we believe, the courts unanimously agree that
the various constitutional conventions used the language pur-
posely to confer a power separate and independent of any
other power to meet exigencies to which the ordinary ap-
pellate powers of the court are not commensurate. * * * It is
well said of this power (People v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 278,
26 Pac. 929): 'It is hardly necessary to add that the "super-
intending control" given by the Constitutional provision now
under consideration refers primarily to courts, not to parties
or cases; its purpose is to keep the courts themselves "within
bounds," and to insure the harmonious working of our judicial
system; it was not designed to secure the review of judgments
in connection with ordinary appellate jurisdiction; and, in so
far as the rights of suitors in particular causes may be af-
fected, the effect is incidental purely. To say that the "super-
intending control" was intended to include ordinary appellate
power is to render the preceding clauses superfluous in so far
as they constitute a grant of such power'."
A brief review of the common-law writs will by contrast
aid in giving to the writ of supervisory control its distinctive
functions.
$State ex reL A. C. M. Co. v. District Court, 25 Mont. 504, 65 Pac. 1020.
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In the case of State ex rel. City of Helena v. Helena W. W.
Co., 43 Mont. 169, 115 Pac. 200, the supreme court said in ef-
fect that the appellate jurisdiction of the court is invoked by
appeal, or perhaps by writ of error. "Appeal and Error" are
generally treated by all text writers under the combined head,
and in this jurisdiction not much use is now made of the writ
of error under that name, appeal having been substituted for
that writ. A prominent text writer (3 C. J. 299) has this to
say about the employment of the writ of error:
WRIT OF ERROR.
"A writ of error is a writ issued out of a dourt of compe-
tent jurisdiction, directed to the judges of a court of record in
which a final judgment has been given, and commanding them
to send the record of the court of appellate jurisdiction therein
named, to be examined, in order that some alleged error in
the proceedings may be corrected.
"The writ of error had its origin at the common law and
was adopted in the United States as a part of the common law
system. While the writ of error is in most cases a writ of
right at the common law it may be limited or altogether
abolished by statute, unless the constitution forbids. The writ
cannot be abolished by the legislature where the power to issue
it is by the constitution vested in the court, and of course it
cannot be abolished in the face of a constitutional provision to
the effect that writs of error shall never be prohibited by law.
But where the constitution provides that appeals and writs
of error shall be allowed from certain final determinations, as
may be provided by law, whether the remedy is by appeal or
writ of error depends upon the legislature; and where the con-
stitution makes provisioll for writs of error, but uses the term,
not in its strict, technical, common-law sense, but to designate
the process by which cases are brought up for appellate review,
it does not have the effect of preserving the common-law
writ." (3 C. J. 299.) At common-law certiorari is said to lie
in all cases where a writ of error does not.
Certiorari is a proceeding appellate in the sense that it
involves a limited review on the proceedings in an inferior
jurisdiction, and lies only to inferior courts and officers exer-
cising judicial powers, and is directed to the court, magistrate,
or board exercising such powers, requiring the certifying of
the record in a matter already determined. Its function is not
to restrain or prohibit but to annul. It is a revisory remedy
for the correction of errors of law apparent on the record,
4
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and will not lie where there is another remedy, except for
want of jurisdiction. United States v. Elliott, 3 Fed. (2d) 496.
Certiorari is a broader writ than writ of error, and will be
issued by a supreme court in the exercise of its general revisory
and appellate jurisdiction only when no other remedy is avail-
able. State v. Coleman, 190 Atl. 791 (R. I.), 109 U. S. R. 797.
Writ of certiorari is not writ of error, MeClatchy v. Supe-
rior -Court, 119 Cal. 413, 419, 51 Pac. 696, 39 L.R.A. 691, it
nevertheless extends to the whole record of the lower court,
Hotaling v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. 501, 217 Pac. 73, and it is
in the nature of a writ of error, McAdam v. Block, 63 N.J.L.
508, 44 Atl. 208, but is broader than writ of error, State v.
Coleman, supra.
The distinction between mandamus and certiorari is that
mandamus issues to compel action and certiorari to review
official or judicial action. 85 N.J.L. 374, 89 Atl. 1017.
Certiorari issues only to a tribunal or a person exercising
judicial acts. Prohibition issues against one exercising either
judicial or ministerial acts. Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 369,
10 Pac. 838.
The six original writs expressly mentioned in section 3 of
Article VIII, all, except the writ of injunction, had well de-
fined uses at the common law, and all, except prohibition and
quo warranto, had been in use under the territorial government
performing their common law functions for many years at the
time the Constitution was adopted. None of them, except
certiorari and prohibition, go exclusively to courts, or tri-
bunals, or officers exercising judicial functions, and certiorari
and prohibition were limited to inquiry into questions of
jurisdiction. The writ of habeas corpus goes only to individ-
uals, not to courts, to inquire into the legality of the imprison-
ment complained of. The writ of quo warranto goes to in-
dividuals to inquire by what authority he usurps an office or.
exercises a particular public franchise. Mandamus and pro-
hibition are for directly opposite purposes. Generally speak-
ing mandamus is to compel action; prohibition to prevent
action. Mandamus is often used to compel a board or officer
to act, but not to correct errors or control discretion. Chief
Justice Brantly, in referring to the six original writs men-
tioned in section 3 of Article VIII, further said, "We are
authorized to issue these writs, in our discretion, for what-
ever purpose they are suitable, without limitation or quali-
fication. 0 * 0 As the appellate jurisdiction was granted for
the purpose of revision and correction, and the original juris-
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diction under these writs was granted to enable us to render
such relief as is appropriate under them, so the supervisory
power was granted to meet emergencies, to which those other
powers and instrumentalities are not commensurate. It is in-
dependent of both, (that is, independent of both the supreme
court's appellate jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction under the
Constitutional writs expressly authorized by section 3 of Article
VIII) and was designed to infringe upon the functions of
neither."
ir. Chief Justice Brantly again said, in the case of A.C.M.
Co. v. District Court, 25 Mont. 505, 521, 65 Pac. 1020, that:
"We also endeavored (in the Whiteside case) to define and
point out the functions of these various powers so that each
might be assigned its appropriate office within the purview
of the constitution, and at the same time not be permitted
to encroach upon the functions of any other. The offices of
the original writs authorized were discussed and defined, and
it was pointed out that they were put into the hands of this
court for prerogative uses, and not as aids to the appellate
jurisdiction; following the previous decisions of this court in
In re MacKnight, 11 Mont. 126, 27 Pac. 336, 28 Am. St. Rep.
451, and State ex rel. Clarke v. Moran, 24 Mont. 433, 63 Pac.
390. It was further pointed out that these writs are not
adapted to supervisory uses, in that they may not properly be
wrested from their well-known and well-defined uses at the
common law, which were inherent in them as adopted into the
constitution. The power of supervisory control was discussed,
and a tentative definition of its functions laid down, so that
it might not be confounded with the other powers granted,
and the clause granting it be thus rendered meaningless. The
means at our disposal for its exercise were likewise discussed,
and it was found that the legislature, so far as action by that
body was necessary, had provided such means.
"After studying the argument of the learned counsel in
this case, and upon further consideration of the subject, we
are confirmed in the conclusions reached in that case, not only
that the power is distinct and independent of any other power
granted, but that, from its nature, it must be exercised by
means of instrumentalities distinct from those by which the
others are made available."
The writ of supervisory control is distinguished from
other original writs in that by its issuance the supreme court
may control the actions of the inferior court in pending litiga-
tion and in a matter within the jurisdiction of such inferior
6
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court. Such, supervisory control by the supreme court can be
exercised under no other writ. The power of the supreme
court to control the course of litigation in the inferior court is
a power which must be exercised with caution since its abuse
would nullify the ordinary appellate procedure. It has been
said, "To this court has been confided and intrusted the ulti-
mate and supreme judicial power of supervisory control over
all the inferior courts within the state. It is a power liable to
abuse, and should be exercised with discretion, caution, spar-
ingly, and only in exigent cases, to protect a manifest right or
to redress a palpable wrong. * 0 The power to exercise a
general supervisory control over district courts, being con-
ferred by a constitutional grant, cannot be lessened or inter-
fered with by the legislative assembly. It may, of course, pre-
scribe reasonable regulations and limitations as to the time
within which, and the mode by which, the relief may be
sought; the procedure is a legitimate subject of legislation,-
for instance, the legislative assembly may require the applica-
tion to be made within a certain period of time, it may require
a bond or undertaking, it may provide for authentication and
certification of the record or transcript, and the like. But it is
without power to deprive this court of any part of its jurisdic-
tion conferred by a rigid constitution." State ex rel. Sutton
v. District Court, 27 Mont. 128, 69 Pac. 988.
It was said in the case of In re Weston, 28 Mont. 207, 215,
72 Pac. 512, that "The supervisory power of this court operates
only upon inferior courts, not upon persons; and, under the
rule of interpretation provided by the constitution itself, it
cannot extend to or affect any other body or any individual
or individuals."
In the case of State ex rel. City of Helena v. Helena Water
Works Co., 43 Mont. 169, 115 Pac. 200, Chief Justice Brantly
again endeavoring to clarify the proper employment of the
writ of supervisory control, said: "The supervisory power-
which is also appellate in its nature-was designed to control
summarily the course of litigation in the inferior courts and
prevent an injustice being done through a mistake of law or a
willful disregard of it when there is no appeal from the er-
roneous order, or the relief obtained through the appeal would
be inadequate." He then follows with the citation of a num-
ber of cases and relative thereto states: "Its appropriate use
is illustrated by the following cases." The student who de-
sires to pursue the ramifications of the use of the writ of
supervisory control will find those cases quite instructive.
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Mr. Justice Sanner, speaking for the court in the case of
State ex rel. Topley v. District Court, 54 Mont. 461, 171 Pac.
273, refers to the writ of supervisory control as the "most
extraordinary of all legal proceedings. 0 * * This proceeding
will not lie unless there is no appeal or the remedy by appeal
is inadequate 0 0 0 ; and we cannot permit it to be used as a
convenient or shorter route to precedence over other causes
equally entitled to our consideration."
In the case of State ex rel. Jerry v. District Court, 57
Mont. 328, 333, the court, speaking again through Chief Justice
Brantly, said: "It is true that relator has an appeal from the
order. That it is so, however, is not conclusive of his right to
relief in this proceeding. In the early case of State ex rel.
Whiteside v. District Court, * * this court held that this
proceeding may be resorted to even though the relator has an
appeal, if the case is exigent and the remedy by appeal is in-
adequate. "
Reference was made to the functions of the writ of super-
visory control and its appropriate employment by Chief Jus-
tice Callaway in the case of Larsen v. District Court in 78
Mont. 435, 254 Pac. 414.
Mr. Justice Ford in the case of State ex rel. Whorley v.
District Court, 88 Mont. 290, 292 Pac. 904, speaking for the
court in that case said: "One of the functions of the writ of
supervisory control 'is to enable this court to control the
course of litigation in the inferior courts where those courts
are proceeding within jurisdiction, but by mistake of law or
willful disregard of it, are doing a gross injustice, and there
is no appeal or the remedy by appeal is inadequate. Under
such circumstances, the case being exigent, no relief could be
granted under other powers of this court and a denial of a
speedy remedy would be tantamount to a denial of justice'."
In the case of State ex rel. Odenwald v. District Court,
98 Mont. 1, 6, 38 Pac. (2d) 269, this court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Matthews, mentions what the court regarded as
justification for employing the writ of supervisory control in
a matter of exigency. It was there said: "An exigency which
will render the ordinary remedy by appeal inadequate may be
defined as something arriving suddenly out of the current of
events; an event or combination of circumstances calling for
immediate action or remedy * * *; where something helpful
needs to be done at once yet not so pressing as an emergency."
In the case of State ex rel. Regis v. District Court, 102
Mont. 74, 55 Pac. (2d) 1295, Mr. Justice Matthews, again
8
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speaking for this court, said: "Assuming that an appeal might
lie from such an order under certain circumstances, the 'super-
visory writ,' evolved by this court as a necessary consequence
of the provision of the Constitution granting to it 'general
supervisory control over all inferior courts' (see. 2, Art. VIII),
and of section 8882 of the Revised Codes of 1921, declaring
that, in the exercise of granted jurisdiction, if the course of
proceeding be not specifically pointed out, any suitable mode
of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most con-
formable to the spirit of the Code, in the absence of any legis-
lative pronouncement on the subject, is employed to correct
error within jurisdiction, independent of either the appellate
or original jurisdiction declared in Article VIII of the Con-
stitution, and is not to be confused with the original writs
therein authorized to be issued by this court. (State ex rel.
Whiteside v. District Court, 24 Mont. 539, 63 Pac. 395.) Neither
the Constitution nor the Codes restrict the right of this court
to issue such a writ; it is in the nature of a summary appeal
-a shortcut-to control the course of litigation in the trial
court when necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice (State
ex rel. Finley v. District Court, 99 Mont. 200, 43 Pac. (2d)
682), and may be employed to prevent extended and needless
litigation. While, ordinarily, the writ will not be issued when
the right of appeal exists, as it is to be used sparingly, the fact
that an appeal is available is not conclusive against the writ."
Citing cases.
Briefly summarizing what has been said, it is fairly estab-
lished (1) that the writ of supervisory control, as distin-
guished from appeal, is issued only in the court's discretion,
while appeal is a matter of right in the litigant. (2) That the
court will not assume jurisdiction in any proceeding by writ
of supervisory control except to determine questions of law.
The facts must be undisputed. (3) The writ issues to deter-
mine questions of law only in actions pending in an inferior
jurisdiction. In this it differs from all other writs which issue
to review and correct matters which have been finally con-
cluded in an inferior jurisdiction. (4) The writ will not issue
when an adequate right of appeal exists. What is an "ade-
quate right" has been set out by this court in a number of
cases. (5) In any proceeding under the writ of supervisory
control, as well as under other constitutional writs, the su-
preme court proceeds under its original not its appellate juris-
diction.
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